Firm News

ROSE KALLOR OBTAINED DEFENSE VERDICTS IN ALL CASES TRIED TO VERDICT IN 2007

Vollemans v. Town of Wallingford

Plaintiff was a former employee of Watertown, who was terminated when his job as the Superintendent of the Pierce Power Station was eliminated because the Station was decommissioned.  Plaintiff brought claims for breach of contract implied contract, promissory estoppel and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; however, plaintiff withdrew his breach of contract and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims before trial.  Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim was tried to the Court (Taylor, J) on April 10 and 11, 2007.

On June 26, 2007, the Court (Taylor, J) rendered a verdict in favor of the defendants.  The opinion can be found at 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1645.  A subsequent motion to reargue was denied.  Judge Taylor held that the Fennell Doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claim for promissory estoppel against a governmental agency.  He also held that the proprietary capacity exception to governmental immunity does not apply to a claim for promissory estoppel.

 

Flaherty v. Borough of Naugatuck

Plaintiff was the former Fire Chief for Naugatuck who retired on March 9, 2002.  He claimed that upon retirement, his accrued unused sick time was not calculated correctly despite the defendant’s promise that he would be paid at 12 hours per day, according to the collective bargaining agreement, as opposed to 7 hours per day and that, therefore, his pension benefits were not calculated correctly.  Plaintiff, however, was not part of the collective bargaining unit.  Plaintiff’s theories of recovery included breach of contract, detrimental reliance and unjust enrichment. 

Plaintiff’s claims were tried to the Court (Gormley, JTR) in early September 2007.  On October 9, 2007, the Court (Gormley, JTR) rendered a verdict in favor of the defendants.  The opinion can be found at 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2635.  Judge Gormley held that the Fennell Doctrine barred all three of the plaintiff’s claims.  Alternatively, Judge Gormley held that even if Fennell did not bar the claim, plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was any contract or unambiguous offer made to him that would entitle him to a verdict in his favor.

 

Sophia v. City of Danbury
         
Plaintiff was the former Executive Secretary for the Chief of Police of the Danbury Police Department.  As part of an Early Retirement Incentive Program, plaintiff applied for early retirement on February 20, 2003.  Her retirement became irrevocable after March 7, 2003, although she attempted to rescind it, by letter from her attorney, on May 9, 2003.  She was not permitted to rescind her retirement and she did retire on June 30, 2003.  Plaintiff brought suit against the City of Danbury, claiming that she was discriminated against because of her gender, age and physical disability and then retaliated against in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. §46a-60(a)(1) and (a)(4).  Summary judgment was granted to the defendant on all claims except for the retaliation claim.

The retaliation claim proceeded to trial in November 2007.  Plaintiff claimed that she was forced to retire, thus amounting to a constructive discharge.  The case was tried to a jury, with Judge Cremins presiding, from November 13 through 16, 2007.  After 12 days of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.  The jury found that the plaintiff was constructively discharged, but found that there was no causal nexus between the constructive discharge and her complaints of harassment.

 

CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT

Palmer v. Friendly’s Ice Cream Corp.

Certification granted to determine whether denial of class certification is subject to interlocutory appeal.  See Palmer v. Friendly’s Ice Cream, Corp., 280 Conn. 918 (2006).  The Superior Court (Sferrazza, J) denied plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class of all servers employed by the defendant in Connecticut.  See Palmer v. Friendly’s Ice Cream Corp., 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 311.  The Connecticut Appellate Court subsequently dismissed plaintiffs’ appeal because an order denying class certification is not subject to an interlocutory appeal under State v. Curcio.  A decision from the Connecticut Supreme Court is due in March 2008.

 

Vollemans v. Town of Wallingford

Certification granted as to the issue of when the 180 day statute of limitations for filing a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities begins to run under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. §46a-82(f).  The Superior Court for the Judicial District of Meriden (Tanzer, J), following federal precedent set out by Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980) which held that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date an employee is notified of an impending termination, granted summary judgment to the defendant because plaintiff was notified of his termination more than 180 days before he filed his complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities.  See Vollemans v. Town of Wallingford, 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 41 (Conn. Super. 2006).  As a matter of first impression, the Connecticut Appellate Court refused to adopt Ricks as the law in Connecticut and reversed.  See Vollemans v. Town of Wallingford, 103 Conn. App. 188 (2007).  The Connecticut Supreme Court will determine whether the statute of limitations set out by Conn. Gen. Stat. §46a-82(f) begins to run upon the employee’s notification or upon his termination.

 

SECOND CIRCUIT

Saltarella v. Town of Enfield, 227 Fed.  Appx. 67 (2d Cir 2007)

Second Circuit affirmed U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut (Arterton, J) ruling, Saltarella v. Town of Enfield, 427 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.Conn. 2006), granting summary judgment to the defendants.  Plaintiff, a former police officer for Enfield, claimed that Enfield and various administrators within the police department retaliated against him for protected speech in violation of the First Amendment and violated equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment when they terminated his employment.  The equal protection was a “class of one claim” and the due process claim was brought under both the procedural and substantive prongs.  The Court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to any of the plaintiff’s claims.

 

DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS

O’Connor v. Pierson, 482 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D.Conn. 2007)

After remand from the Second Circuit, O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2005), the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut (Chatigny, J) granted summary judgment to the defendants.  The Court held that because the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in Superior Court for the Judicial District of Hartford, where the finding was for the defendant after appeal, O’Connor v. Wethersfield, 90 Conn. App. 59, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 912 (2005), res judicata barred plaintiff’s claims.  This case is currently on appeal to the Second Circuit.

 

Milardo v. City of Middletown, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93070 (D.Conn. 2007)

The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut (Arterton, J) granted summary judgment to the defendants on the plaintiff’s complaint alleging “class of one” equal protection, and free speech retaliation claims.  Plaintiff, the former Director of Communications for the City of Middletown, was terminated after he was arrested and pled guilty to breach of peace charges and failed to return to work after an extended leave of absence.  The Court held that the plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to support either of his claims and that there was no genuine issue of material fact for a jury to decide.

 

Sebold v. City of Middletown, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70081 (D.Conn. 2007)

The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut (Nevas, J) granted partial summary judgment to the defendants.  Plaintiff, a former dispatcher for the City of Middletown emergency services, claimed that she was constructively discharged and suffered other harms because her former supervisor discriminated against and harassed her because of her age and gender, in violation of the equal protection and substantive due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII, the ADEA, and the CFEPA, Conn. Gen. Stat. §46a-60(a)(1) and (a)(7) and retaliated against her for protected speech and activity in violation of the First Amendment, Conn. Gen. Stat. §31-51m, Title VII, the ADEA, and the CFEPA, Conn. Gen. Stat. §46a-60(a)(4).  She also brought claims for aiding and abetting retaliation, in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. §46a-60(a)(5) and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

All claims brought pursuant to the CFEPA were dismissed at summary judgment because plaintiff failed to obtain a release of jurisdiction from the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities.  Summary judgment was granted to the City of Middletown on all other claims except for those brought for sexual harassment and retaliation pursuant to Title VII.  Summary judgment was also specifically granted to the former mayor, who was sued individually, on all claims.